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Abstract 
Research in recent years has touted the benefits of positive emotions. However, new studies 
suggest that actively trying to be positive can backfire, leaving a person feeling worse than 
before. In this study, the efficacy of implicit goals of positivity as an alternate mechanism for 
mood improvement was investigated. All participants completed a negative mood induction 
before completing a thought task while being exposed to either positive or neutral environmental 
cues.  During the task, participants were either asked to try to “improve their mood” or to list 
whatever thoughts came to their mind. A variety of measures, including number of thoughts, 
thought automaticity, thought valence, and degree of mood repair were collected across 
conditions. Despite research to the contrary, most participants experienced greater positivity 
when given an explicit goal to try to be positive. However, among participants prone to 
rumination, implicit goals were comparatively more effective in generating positivity. Though 
the implicit mechanism of environmental cues may not be effective for all people, it seems to be 
preferable for those with a tendency to dwell on negative thoughts. The possibilities for follow-
up research and for practical applications of such findings are discussed. 
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Implicit Positivity: Improving Mood with Environmental Cues 
 In recent years, popular culture has touted the power of positivity, and with good reason.  
Evidence supporting the mental, social, psychological, and physical benefits of positive emotions 
abounds in psychological literature.  Positive emotions have been found to increase cognitive 
breadth, leading to more creative (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), unusual (Isen, Johnson, 
Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), flexible (Isen & Daubman, 1984), and efficient (Isen & Means, 1983) 
thinking.  These emotions promote stronger relationships (Aron et al., 2000), more unpredictable 
and interesting social interactions (Gottman, 1998), and reduced prejudice, aggression, and 
violence toward outgroup members (Bridgeman, 1981; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1982).  They also 
help to de-escalate anger and interpersonal conflict (Gottman, 1998; Smith, 1973).  Resilience 
and optimism have also been found to increase with positivity (Fredrickson et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, positive emotions have even been found to reduce life stress and related illness 
(Cousins, 1985; Fry, 1994; Kuiper & Martin, 1998; Stone et al., 1994), improve heart health via 
stronger vagal tone (Kok et al., 2013), and increase the length of the lifespan (Danner et al., 
2001).   
 These findings can be summarized by Fredrickson’s (1998) “broaden and build” theory, 
which states that positive emotions broaden an individual’s patterns of cognition and serve to 
build the personal resources available to him or her.  When experiencing positive emotions, 
people attend more to the peripheral details of their environment (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994) 
and can act with a broader variety of behavioral responses (Kahn & Isen, 1993).  In contrast, 
negative emotions are more blatantly tied to survival and are associated with “specific action 
tendencies” (Fridja, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1994).  Emotions such as fear or anxiety 
trigger the notion that something in the environment is threatening and must be addressed (e.g. 
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LeDoux, 1996).  These emotions thus narrow an individual’s focus (Easterbrook, 1959) to 
identify the source of threat and limit their choice of action (Levenson, 1992) to best respond to 
the threat.   
 Positive and negative emotions thus appear to play contrasting roles.  In fact, positive 
emotions have been shows to counteract, or “undo,” the effects of negative emotions.  Decades 
of research support the idea that positive emotions are incompatible with negative emotions 
(Baron, 1976; Cabanac, 1971; Nezu, Nezu, & Blissett, 1988; Solomon, 1980; Wolpe, 1958).  
However, until recently, no research served to examine the direct impact that positive emotions 
had on negative states.  Recent research shows that encouraging positive emotions can revert the 
cardiovascular effects, such as rapid heartbeat, of negative emotions such as fear (Fredrickson & 
Levenson, 1998) or anxiety (Fredrickson, Mancuso, et al., 1999).  Positive emotions not only 
exact their own effects, but they also serve to resolve the negative effects of negative emotions. 
Positivity thus appears to be a worthy goal.  In fact, the pursuit of positive emotions, such 
as happiness, is built into our Declaration of Independence and it a tenet of the American 
lifestyle.  It should then be no surprise that most people think about happiness on a daily basis 
(Freedman, 1978) and consider happiness to be very important to them (Diener, Suh, Smith, & 
Shao, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990).  Several reports show that a majority of 
people explicitly value happiness and set goals to attain it (Myers, 2000; Diener, 2000).  Though 
these studies focused specifically on happiness, they may represent the widespread pursuit of 
positivity at large. 
For some, however, this goal is less realistic.  Consider depression, a disorder whose 
symptoms “often involve lack of positive emotion” (Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2006) or 
anxiety, which is characterized by negative intrusive thoughts (Aydin, 2009).  Such disorders and 
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their milder counterparts represent a significant deficit in positivity for those who have them.  Do 
these individuals simply “miss out” on the benefits of positive emotions, or can they be directed 
toward positivity? 
Striving for Happiness 
 Practitioners of several models of therapy, such as positive psychotherapy or variations of 
cognitive-behavioral therapy, have addressed the issue of positivity in the context of disordered 
thinking (see Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2004 and Karlin et. al, 2012, for examples).  These 
models emphasize the goal of gaining positivity rather than simply reducing negativity and have 
found marked success.  Once more, achieving positive emotions, and not just reducing negative 
emotions, is the goal. 
According to standard models of goal pursuit (e.g. Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996) 
valuing positivity and setting a goal to achieve it would lead one to feel more positive.  One sets 
goals according to his or her values and then strives to achieve them, resulting in goal 
fulfillment.  However, the specific case of positivity has a less straightforward path.  In fact, 
some recent research suggests that actively seeking positive emotions may be detrimental.  
 While a person’s values do determine his or her goals, such values also determine the 
standard against which progress toward the goal is compared (Carver & Scheier, 1981).  When 
progress falls short of one’s standard, the result is a shift from positive expectations to negative 
results (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2000).  This violation of expectations leads to frustration and 
thereby suffering (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1997) and is the basis of a host of negative emotional 
experiences (e.g., Mandler, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Stein & Levine, 1987, 1990).   
For most goals, disappointment does not directly detract from one’s success at achieving 
the goal.  Though a person is upset by their lack of progress, he can still continue toward and 
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ultimately achieve his goal.  However, in the case of positivity, the suffering induced by failing 
to meet one’s standards is in direct opposition to the goal (Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, 
2003).  If a person values positive emotions, such as joy, he may set high expectations of what 
“joy” should be (Carver & Sheier, 1981).  Then, in evaluating his joy compared to that standard, 
he is more apt to feel disappointed at his current level of joy.  Because joy and disappointment 
are opposing states, his disappointment will lead him further from his goal of joy.  
Mauss et al. (2011) describe such a goal as a “paradoxical” goal.  In evaluating progress 
toward the goal, one pushes themselves farther away from achieving their goal.  For instance, 
Shapira (2013) found that giving participants an explicit goal of being close to another led to 
decreased ratings of closeness.  In attempting to monitor closeness, people observed more 
distance between themselves and therefore felt farther from their goal of closeness.  
The effect is particularly strong for goals involving positive emotions.  An early study by 
Schwartz and Inbar-Saban (1988) found that participants who highly valued happiness failed to 
lose weight in a long-term weight loss study, whereas those who prioritized wisdom were 
successful, suggesting a detrimental impact of valuing happiness.  Later research investigated the 
particular mechanism behind this detriment.  Mauss and colleagues found that when participants 
were led to value happiness, they reported increased feelings of loneliness (2012) and decreased 
levels of positive emotions at large (2011).  This research suggests that the explicit goal of a 
positive emotions, such as happiness, is often what makes one less positive and leads to negative 
consequences.   
Further, the damaging effects of striving for positivity seem to be especially detrimental 
to those who would most benefit from a goal of increased positivity.  Wood, Perunovic, & Lee 
(2009) conducted a study in which participants were asked to repeat positive self-statements, 
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such as “I am a lovable person,” and later report their mood.  They found that while participants 
with high self-esteem reported limited mood repair after repeating such statements, those with 
low self-esteem reported significantly more negative mood after the repetition.  The researchers 
theorize that this occurred because repeating the statement continuously called to mind reasons 
why the statement was not true, at least in the perception of the participants.  The attempt to 
repair mood using this common mechanism backfired for those whose mood was most subject to 
negativity.  Therefore, it appears that an explicit goal of positivity is commonly self-defeating.  
How, then, can we try to cultivate positive emotions? 
Implicit Emotion Regulation 
Implicit goals of emotion regulation may provide a solution.  Evidence suggests that 
implicit, or automatic, goals can be just as potent as explicit, or conscious, goals (Bargh et al, 
2001).  For instance, Chartrand and Bargh (1996) found that giving participants an implicit goal 
of impression formation or of memorization changed the way they processed information in 
order to better suit their specific goal.  Implicit goals can also change a person’s behavior, 
leading them to cooperate more with a partner (Bargh et al, 2001), perform better on 
achievement tasks (Bargh et al, 2001), and be more honest on self-report measures (Rasinski, 
Visser, Zagatsky,& Rickett, 2004).   
Such goals have also been effective with regard to emotions.  In one study, Mauss, Cook, 
and Gross (2007) showed that participants who were primed with words concerning emotion 
control in a sentence unscrambling task, and thus given an implicit goal to control their 
emotions, demonstrated less reaction to an anger provocation.  Further research suggests that 
those who implicitly value emotion regulation are more engaged in it and capable of it, leading 
to positive outcomes such as lower rates of depression and increased well-being (Hopp, Troy, & 
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Mauss, 2011).  In fact, after finding that implicit positivity could be boosted by activating one’s 
concept of the self with self-referential primes, researchers found that increased implicit 
positivity decreased negative affect (Quirin, Bode, & Kuhl, 2011).  It seems that, given the right 
implicit motivation, the emotion regulation system can be guided away from negative emotions 
and toward more positive outcomes without actively trying to “feel better.”  
Another line of research suggests that such implicit goals may be influencing a 
preexisting automatic emotion regulation system.  Gilbert et al. (1998) posit the existence of a 
“psychological immune system.”  When faced with negative emotions, the psychological system 
shuts down responses to the negative emotions and instead attends to more positive stimuli to 
adjust mood.  Research supports this notion.  For instance, DeWall and Baumeister (2007) found 
that reminding participants of the notion of death facilitated access to positive emotional 
information and enhanced attention to positive over neutral stimuli.  In the presence of negative 
thoughts, attention automatically shifted to positive stimuli, presumably to improve mood.  In a 
different study, DeWall et al. (2011) found that after failing to be selected to be part of a social 
group, participants recalled a greater proportion of positive childhood memories on an ostensibly 
unrelated recall task.  Social rejection thus increased implicit positive affect.  When presented 
with negative situations, people begin to engage implicit positivity on a nonconsious level. 
Work on automatic thoughts supports the idea of an automatic tendency toward mood 
repair on a cognitive level.  Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, and Phillips (2009) found that 
participants who were induced to feel negative affect demonstrated more mind-wandering, 
indicating a greater presence of automatic, rather than controlled, thoughts.  If negative affect 
results in both mind-wandering and mood repair, we hypothesize that an increased amount of 
positive automatic thoughts may account for increased positive affect.  Indeed, the results of a 
IMPROVING MOOD WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CUES 9 
study conducted by Lightsey et al. (2013) confirm that having more positive automatic thoughts 
is associated with increased positivity.  To date, no studies have investigated the mediating 
effects of positive automatic thoughts on mood repair.  
If an automatic mood regulation system exists and is sensitive to implicit goals, then 
implicit goals of positivity may provide a solution to the pitfalls of consciously seeking 
positivity.  Because implicit goals are nonconscious, progress toward them cannot be constantly 
monitored.  Such goals should eliminate the disappointment that one feels when “positivity” is 
not adequately attained and should allow one to continue seeking, and eventually achieve, 
greater levels of positivity.   
The Present Study 
In the present study, we aim to test the hypothesis that implicit goals of positivity are 
more effective than explicit goals in repairing a negative mood.  We intend to engender implicit 
emotion regulation goals through the use of environmental cues.  Because such cues can easily 
be used in a day-to-day environment, the successful use of such cues to prompt implicit goals 
will provide a practical application of implicit goal research by providing a mechanism that is 
accessible to those outside of the lab environment.  Custers and Aarts (2005) suggested that 
environmental cues may enhance the “mental accessibility of goal representations” and prompt 
implicit goals, an idea which has found empirical support.  For instance, commercial “primes” 
for snack foods increased unhealthy eating habits at home (Harris et al., 2009).  On a more 
positive note, a study by Papies and Hamstra (2010) found that the use of posters encouraging 
healthy eating behavior led participants to consume less snack items from a grocery sample 
counter.  Environmental cues can influence implicit goals and drive thoughts and/or behavior.  
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 In sum, we will examine whether implicit goals of positivity, as driven by environmental 
cues, are more effective in aiding recovery from a negative mood.  This design will particularly 
examine the mechanism of positive automatic thoughts.  We expect that mood repair will be 
predicted by the incidence of positive automatic thoughts.  In other words, more positive 
thoughts will predict greater mood repair.   
 This study will make use of a 2 X 2 experimental design.  Differing instructions in a 
thought-listing task will determine whether or not the participant is using an explicit goal to 
improve mood.  The instruction type will be crossed with the valence of the environmental cues, 
either positive or negative, to vary the nature of the implicit goal.  Positive cues will give an 
implicit goal, while neutral cues will not.  The 2 X 2 design will allow us to determine if the 
nonconscious, automatic mood regulation system is actually more effective and whether or not 
that system can be influenced by environmental stimuli. 
We expect a main effect of instruction type such that those in the automatic thought 
condition will demonstrate greater recovery from negative mood than those in the directed 
thought condition as measured by mood repair, thought valence, proportion of positive thoughts, 
and number of positive thoughts.  Further, we expect an interaction of instruction type and cue 
valence such that, within the automatic thought condition, those given positive thought cues will 
demonstrate greater recovery than those given neutral thought cues due to the implicit goal of 
positivity. 
 Additionally, we will explore several secondary hypotheses.  As the effectiveness of 
explicit versus implicit goals of emotion regulation is yet to be explored, it is possible that the 
effect will be moderated by individual differences that this design does not account for. 
Therefore, we will also investigate the effect of several trait measures on the outcome of this 
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design.  We expect that individuals with a high level of rumination will exhibit decreased 
recovery from negative emotion across conditions, leading to a main effect of level of rumination 
on resultant positivity.  However, we expect that, among ruminators, the use of an implicit goal 
of positivity will indeed be more effective than an explicit goal.  Similarly, we expect that 
individuals exhibiting greater pessimism will demonstrate decreased recovery from negative 
mood across conditions, but that, among pessimists, the use of an implicit goal will be more 
effective.  If these individual differences do impact the results of the primary analyses, our 
secondary hypotheses will allow a more complete understanding of the results. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and sixty five participants from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill were recruited for this study.  All participants were students of General Psychology courses 
on campus and registered anonymously for sessions via an online university participant pool.  
Each participant was compensated with partial class credit for their participation. 
 Of the students that participated, 127 were women and 36 were men.  Two participants 
did not provide gender information.  Participants were aged 17-21 with an average age of 18.4. 
The ethnic composition was mixed: 72.6% Caucasian, 8.5% African American, 9.1% East Asian, 
4.2% South Asian, and 5.5% reporting other ethnic identities. 
Procedure 
 Participants arrived at the lab and were seated in a cubicle designed to resemble the office 
of the researcher.  The cubicle contained a standard set of materials including research books, a 
weekly calendar, and several personal pictures.  In addition, a series of quotes and images were 
placed on the walls of the cubicle.   
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The content of the quotes and images varied by experimental condition.  In the positive 
condition, the stimuli focused on the goal of being positive.  In the neutral condition, the stimuli 
were centered on the topic of research.  All stimuli were matched for color, size, and amount of 
text to control for extraneous variables.   
Before beginning the session, participants were given a brief overview of the 
experimental setup and were asked to give their informed consent. Participants were then asked 
to engage in a brief writing task.  The task was intended to be a negative mood induction in 
which participants were asked to write about a recent negative experience in which they felt 
sadness, fear, or shame.  This method has been shown to have an effect on mood lasting 
approximately 15 minutes and therefore fit the study time frame (Abele, 1990).  Mood was 
assessed immediately following the task. 
Following the mood induction, participants engaged in a thought listing task.  The 
paradigm was modeled from a study by Cacioppo, Glass, and Merluzzi, (1979).  In each 
condition, participants were asked to list “any and all thoughts” that crossed their mind in a three 
minute time frame.  The specific instructions varied by condition. In the automatic condition, 
participants were simply asked to list all of their thoughts.  In the directed condition, participants 
were given the additional instruction to try to “improve their mood” and “feel better.”  These two 
conditions were crossed with the two cue conditions to create a fully crossed 2 X 2 design.  As 
they listed each thought, participants were asked to rate the automaticity of each thought.   
A second mood evaluation was conducted after the thought listing task in order to assess 
mood improvement.  Afterward, participants were asked to return to their thought task and rate 
the valence of each thought. 
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To conclude the study session, participants completed a variety of surveys to assess levels 
of rumination and life orientation.  Demographic information was collected at this time.  
Before leaving, all participants were debriefed about the true nature of the study and 
provided with information regarding counseling resources in the event that the writing task 
provoked any lingering emotional distress. 
Measures 
 Mood evaluation: The affect grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989) assesses mood 
on a nine by nine grid along dimensions of valence and arousal.  The four quadrants of the grid 
represent variable levels of energy and pleasantness.  For example, a response in the upper right 
of the grid represents positive valence and high arousal indicative of emotions such as joy.  A 
lower left quadrant response represents negative valence and low arousal, as seen in depression.  
Participants are asked to select one box on the grid that best represents their feelings in the 
present moment.  Each dimension is coded separately on a scale of -4 to 4.  Mood repair will be 
calculated by subtracting the mood valence scores of the pre-thought task mood evaluation from 
those of the post-thought task mood evaluation. 
 Thought Automaticity: Participants were directed to rate how automatic each thought they 
listed was on a scale of 1, or not at all automatic, meaning that they had to consciously conjure 
that thought, to 5, or entirely automatic, meaning that the thought simply popped into their mind.  
The scale was described to each participant as written above.  The automaticity scores of each 
thought were averaged to provide a summary score for thought automaticity. 
 Thought Valence: Participants rated the valence of each thought listed on a scale of 1, 
meaning very negative, to 5, meaning very positive.  A rating of 3 suggested a neutral thought.  
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The valence scores of each thought were averaged to provide a summary score for thought 
valence. 
 Rumination: The Ruminative Responses Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003) assesses one’s typical ruminative tendencies, including the tendency to dwell on past 
negative events and linger in negative moods.   It contains 22 items and is assessed on a 1, 
meaning almost never, to 4, meaning almost always, Likert scale.  The scale includes items such 
as “How often do you think about how sad you feel?” and “How often do you analyze recent 
events to try to understand why you are depressed?”  In this study, several items were edited to 
better reflect sad mood rather than depression and to inquire about a school, rather than a work, 
setting to better suit the sample population.  The scores of each item were summed to provide a 
total rumination score.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of rumination.  The scale 
demonstrated high reliability in this study (α=.907). 
 Life Outlook: The Life Orientation Test – Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) 
was used to assess optimism.  The scale measures one’s overall outlook on life, typified as 
optimism or pessimism.  It contains ten statements to which participants respond from 1, 
meaning I disagree a lot, to 5, meaning I agree a lot.  Sample items include “I’m always 
optimistic about my future” and “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.”  Three items, 
including “I hardly ever expect things to go my way,” are reverse scored.  All scores are 
averaged to provide a mean representative score for life orientation.  This scale showed adequate 
reliable in this study (α=.810). 
  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
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Manipulation checks were used to assess the effectiveness of the negative mood 
induction and of the thought instructions.  Participants in all conditions should have reported 
consistently negative mood following the negative mood induction.  However, on average, mood 
was neutral (M = 0.26, SD = 2.22).  A one-way analysis of variance showed that there was no 
significant differences in mood valence between groups following the mood induction, F(3,163) 
= 0.455, p < 0.714, signifying that all groups responded equally to the induction.  The median 
reported mood valence was 0.00, and nearly half (48.2%) of participants reported positive mood 
(Table 1; Figure 1).  Despite the lack of negative response to the manipulation, all participant 
data were retained for analysis. 
Participants in the automatic thought condition should have reported more automatic 
thoughts than those in the directed thought condition as they were not given an explicit goal for 
how to think.  However, no significant differences in thought automaticity were found between 
the two thought instruction conditions.  A t-test returned no significant difference in average 
thought automaticity between the directed (M = 3.47, SD = 0.65) and the automatic (M = 3.43, 
SD = 0.58) thought conditions, t = 0.397, p < 0.692.  Means for both groups were neutral.  A 
separate t-test yielded no significant difference in the proportion of automatic thoughts reported 
between the directed (M = 0.52, SD = 0.25) and the automatic (M = 0.52, SD = 0.22) thought 
conditions, t = -0.044, p < 0.965.  Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the total 
number of thoughts reported between the directed (M = 12.64, SD = 6.08) and the automatic 
(M=12.55, SD = 5.5), t = 0.105, p < 0.917.  The manipulation checks did not support the 
effectiveness of the varying thought instructions between the two groups. 
Primary Hypotheses 
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Among the total sample, mean mood repair was 0.75 (SD = 2.29), mean thought valence 
was 3.14 (SD = 0.63), and the mean thought ratio (number of positive thoughts of total thoughts) 
was 0.39 (SD = 0.22).  As expected, increases in mood repair were predicted by an increase in 
positive automatic thoughts.  Mood repair was significantly correlated with both average thought 
valence (r = 0.244, p < 0.002) and with the proportion of positive thoughts recorded (r = 0.254, p 
< 0.001).  These correlations are represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.  R-values are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 Recovery from negative mood, or resultant positivity, following the thought task was 
assessed using four dependent variables: change in reported mood (hereafter referred to as ‘mood 
repair’), average valence of reported thoughts (‘thought valence’), proportion of positive 
thoughts of all thoughts reported (‘proportion of positive thoughts’), and total number of positive 
thoughts reported.  Each dependent variable was subjected to a two-way analysis of variance 
with two levels of instruction type (directed or automatic) and two levels of environmental cues 
(neutral or positive). 
Contrary to hypotheses, there was a main effect of instruction type for all four dependent 
variables such that those in the directed thought condition demonstrated significantly greater 
resultant positivity than those in the automatic thought condition (Table 3; Figure 4).  The 
analysis yielded a main effect for instruction type, F(1,161) = 10.243, p < 0.002, such that mood 
repair was significantly greater in the directed thought condition (M = 1.321, SD = 0.249) than in 
the automatic thought condition (M = 0.202, SD = 0.245).  The main effect of instruction type on 
thought valence was also significant, F(1,161) = 6.159, p < 0.014, indicating that thoughts were 
significantly more positive in the directed thought condition (M = 3.267, SD = 0.069) than in the 
automatic thought condition (M = 3.026, SD = 0.068).  Likewise, a main effect emerged for 
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instruction type on proportion of positive thoughts, F(1,161) = 8.945, p < 0.003, meaning that 
there was a greater proportion of positive thoughts in the directed thought condition (M = 0.438, 
SD = 0.025) than in the automatic thought condition (M = 0.335, SD = 0.024).  Finally, the 
analysis returned a main effect of instruction type on number of positive thoughts, F(1,161) = 
6.202, p < 0.014, such that a significantly higher number of positive thoughts was reported in the 
directed thought condition (M = 6.142, SD = 0.494) than in the automatic thought condition (M = 
4.417, SD = 0.485).   
Also contrary to predictions, the analyses yielded no significant interactions.  The 
interaction between instruction type and cue type was insignificant for mood repair [F(1,161) = 
0.089, p = 0.766], thought valence [F(1,161) = 0.208, p = 0.649], proportion of positive thoughts 
[F(1,161) = 0.220, p = 0.640], and for number of positive thoughts [F(1,161) = 1.781, p = 0.184].  
Across all dependent variables, then, the thought instructions produced a similar unexpected 
effect regardless of cue type.  
Secondary Hypotheses 
Because the expected results were not demonstrated in the full sample, trait rumination 
and trait pessimism were explored as potential moderating factors.  Each trait was first used in a 
two-way analysis of variance as an independent variable with two levels (high trait level and low 
trait level).  A 2 X 2 ANOVA (trait level X instruction type) was conducted on the sample.  The 
“cue type” variable was removed from this analysis to isolate the impact of instruction type on 
each group in these analyses.  All results are summarized in Table 4. 
Scores on the Rumination Scale were used to split the sample.  The sample was split at 
the median rumination score (median = 50) to create a high rumination group and a low 
rumination group.  The four dependent variables for resultant positivity, as described above, 
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were analyzed using a two-way analysis of variance with two levels of instruction type (directed 
and automatic) and two levels of rumination (low or high). 
As expected, there was a main effect of rumination level on several measures of resultant 
positivity.  The two-way analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect of rumination 
level on average thought valence, F(1, 161) = 11.650, p < 0.001, such that thoughts were 
significantly less positive among high ruminators (M = 2.986, SD = 0.066) than low ruminators 
(M = 3.306, SD = 0.067).  The main effect of rumination level on proportion of positive thoughts 
was also significant, F(1,161) = 4.954, p < 0.027, such high ruminators reported significantly 
fewer positive thoughts (M = 0.348, SD = 0.024) than low ruminators (M = 0.424, SD = 0.024).  
However, there was no main effect of rumination level on mood repair (F(1,161) = 0.00, p = 
0.992) nor on number of positive thoughts (F(1,161) = 0.867, p = 0.353). 
There was, however, a significant interaction between level of rumination and instruction 
type on mood repair, F(1,161) = 4.907, p < 0.028, such that whereas ruminators in the directed 
thought condition demonstrated less mood repair, those in the automatic thought condition 
demonstrated greater mood repair (Figure 4).  However, no significant interactions between level 
of rumination and instruction type were found for thought valence [F(1,161) = 1.477, p = 0.226], 
proportion of positive thoughts [F(1,161) = 2.169, p = 0.143], nor number of positive thoughts 
[F(1,161) = 1.181, p = 0.279]. 
Following those analyses, those in the high trait group were isolated and the resulting 
sample was subjected to a 2 X 2 ANOVA (rumination X instruction type).  The original 
hypotheses were then retested on the high ruminating group alone (N = 78).  A two-way analysis 
of variance was conducted for each of the four dependent variables with two levels of instruction 
type (directed and automatic) and two levels of cue type (neutral and positive). There was no 
IMPROVING MOOD WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CUES 19 
main effect of instruction on mood repair [F(1,74) = 0.530, p = 0.469], thought valence [F(1,74) 
= 0.148, p = 0.702], proportion of positive thoughts [F (1,74) = 0.629, p = 0.430], or number of 
positive thoughts [F(1,74) = 0.417, p = 0.521] among the high ruminating group. 
However, there was a marginally significant interaction of instruction type and cue type 
on positive thoughts, F(1,74) = 3.638, p < 0.060, such that while ruminators in the automatic 
thought condition reported fewer positive thoughts in the neutral cue condition, those in the 
positive cue condition reported more positive thoughts (Figure 5).  There was no significant 
interaction of instruction type and cue type on mood repair [F(1,74)=0.088, p=0.768], thought 
valence [F(1,74)=0.694, p=0.407], or proportion of positive thoughts [F(1,74)=0.403, p=0.528].  
There was some evidence that, whereas the expected interactions were not present in the full 
sample, they surfaced in the ruminative subset. 
Similar analyses were performed regarding trait pessimism.  Scores on the Life 
Orientation Test-Revised were used to split the sample.  The sample was split at the median 
score (median=3.2) into high and low pessimism groups.  A two-way analysis of variance was 
conducted for each of the four dependent variables with two levels of instruction type (directed 
and automatic) and two levels of life outlook (pessimist and optimist). 
 There was a main effect of life outlook on several of the dependent variables.  The two-
way analysis of variance returned a main effect of life outlook on thought valence, F(1,161) = 
12.084, p < 0.001, such that thoughts were significantly less positive among the high pessimism 
group (M = 2.957, SD = 0.072) than among the low pessimism group (M = 3.287, SD = 0.062).  
There was also a main effect of life outlook on the proportion of positive thoughts, F(1,161) = 
9.085, p < 0.003, such that there was a significantly smaller proportion of positive thoughts 
among the high pessimism group (M = 0.327, SD = 0.026) than among the low pessimism group 
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(M = 0.430, SD = 0.022.  Finally, the main effect of life outlook on the number of positive 
thoughts reported was marginally significant, F(1.161) = 3.066, p < 0.082, such that fewer 
positive thoughts were reported among the high pessimism group (M = 4.566, SD = 0.526) than 
among the low pessimism group (M = 5.784, SD = 0.456).  However, there was no main effect of 
life outlook on mood repair, F(1,161) = 1.187, p < 0.654. 
 There was no significant interaction of instruction type and life outlook on mood repair 
[F(1,161) = 0.202, p = 0.654], thought valence [F(1,161) = 0.715, p = 0.399], proportion of 
positive thoughts [F(1,161) = 0.266, p = 0.607], nor number of positive thoughts [F(1,161) = 
1.006, p = 0.317]. 
 As with the rumination analyses, the primary hypotheses were then tested on the high 
pessimism group alone.  A two-way analysis of variance was conducted for each of the four 
dependent variables with two levels of instruction type (directed and automatic) and two levels 
of cue type (neutral and positive). 
 There were no significant results in these analyses.  There was no main effect of 
instruction on mood repair [F(1,67) = 2.725, p = 0.103], thought valence [F(1,67) = 0.638, p = 
0.427], proportion of positive thoughts [F(1,67) = 2.162, p = 0.146], nor number of positive 
thoughts [F(1,67) = 0.525, p = 0.471].  There was also no interaction of instruction type and cue 
type on mood repair [F(1,67) = 0.047, p = 0.829], thought valence [F(1,67) = 0.638, p = 0.427], 
proportion of positive thoughts [F(1,67) = 0.065, p = 0.800], nor number of positive thoughts 
[F(1,67) = 0.209, p = 0.649].  Trait pessimism did not seem to have any impact on the effect of 
the manipulation. 
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Discussion 
 This study was designed to test whether implicit goals of positivity could be more 
effective in improving negative mood than explicit goals.  Evidence suggests that explicit goals 
to be more positive can backfire, but according to recent evidence, implicit goals could avoid this 
issue.  It was expected that participants given an implicit goal, as prompted by positive 
environmental cues, would exhibit greater recovery from negative mood than participants who 
were simply told to try to feel better. 
Unfortunately, this design did not support the primary hypotheses.  According to the data, 
it was found that individuals with an explicit goal of positivity reported greater positivity as 
represented by better mood, more positive thought valence, a greater proportion of positive 
thoughts, and a greater total number of positive thoughts.  The “backfiring” effect of striving for 
positivity that was present in previous studies was not supported by this design - those given an 
explicit goal actually fared better.  The automatic mood repair system, as prompted by 
environmental cues, was less effective in this experiment. 
 It is possible that the hypotheses were well founded, but this design was not adequate to 
support them.  There were several flaws in this design that could have detracted from its overall 
success.  First and foremost, the manipulations were not effective.  The analyses suggest that the 
negative mood induction only worked for approximately 50% of participants (see Table 1).  If 
participants were not feeling negative to begin with, there would be no negativity to contrast with 
the goal of positivity.  Therefore, the explicit goal would fail to be “paradoxical” to begin with 
and there would then be no reason to expect a backfiring effect of the goal.  If one is already 
positive or even neutral, then the explicit goal of positivity becomes an easy goal to attain.  
Furthermore, without negative emotions present, there is no reason for the nonconscious mood 
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repair mechanism to take action, meaning that implicit goals would also fail to be effective.  
Without the presence of negativity at the start of this experiment, the primary hypotheses could 
not be properly tested.  Further investigation of these hypotheses would benefit from a more 
effective mood induction.   
It may be that this particular mood induction was not well standardized.  Each participant 
was required to reflect on a personal experience and write about it.  Effectiveness may thus vary 
according to each participant’s motivation and ability to pursue such reflection.  One way to 
improve effectiveness would be to place the induction in the hands of the experimenter.  Studies 
have supported the use of a storytelling mood induction in which the experimenter reads a story 
with a distinct emotional tone (such as sadness) to the participant and instructs them to imagine 
that the events of the story are happening to them (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).  Using 
this method would ensure that each participant was given the same stimulus and dedicated the 
same amount of time to the induction.  This method has been effective for inducing both sadness 
and anxiety in prior studies and may be more effective in a design like this (Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990). 
 The data also failed to support the effectiveness of the manipulation of thought 
instructions.  If the manipulation had worked, then those in the directed thought condition should 
have reported less automatic thoughts as they should have been focused on their goal of 
improving their mood.  However, the data show that there were no differences in thought 
automaticity between groups.  Therefore, it may be that those in the directed thought condition 
ignored their explicit goal.  Without that goal, there would be no reason for the “backfiring,” as 
the goal was not present to begin with, providing another reason  that the hypotheses may not 
have been supported.   
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 This design was also susceptible to demand characteristics.  The design called for the use 
of an explicit goal, meaning that individuals were told exactly what they were supposed to do.  
Unfortunately, it also made use of an explicit measure.  Participants were asked to try to feel 
better and were then asked to report how they felt.  If the typical model of demand characteristics 
is applied here, then it may not be surprising that participants would report feeling better on the 
second mood evaluation because they believed that is what they were “supposed” to do.  The 
data are consistent with this explanation.  Participants in the directed thought condition reported 
feeling more positive and having more positive thoughts than did those in the automatic thought 
condition.  While other measures were used to try to combat the demand characteristics, the use 
of such explicit measures to measure the outcome of an explicit goal was a clear pitfall of this 
design.   
The use of implicit mood measures may have added clarity to the results of this study. 
For instance, the recently-developed Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT) 
presents participants with nonsense words from a fictional language and asks them to rate the 
extent to which the words express a variety of affective states (Quirin & Bode, 2014).  Because 
the words have no inherent meaning, it is presumed that participants will project their implicit 
affect onto the meaning of the word.  This measure is less subject to demand characteristics and 
may be able to shed light on any effects this design has on implicit affect. 
 The final issue with this design concerns the sample.  While not quite a “problem,” the 
fact remains that the sample used for this study was a healthy sample.  A majority of the 
participants reported low rumination scores, as the mean was 48.1 of a possible 88 and 75% of 
participants fell below a score of 57 (see Figure 7).  These individuals would have a reduced 
tendency to dwell on negative thoughts, such as those induced by the writing task, and therefore 
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may have been perfectly capable of calling positive thoughts to mind when given a direct goal to 
try to be positive.  If this were the case, then the explicit goal of positivity would have worked 
perfectly and there would be no need to find a “more effective” mechanism, such as an implicit 
goal.  It may be that with a less healthy sample, such as those prone to negative cognitive 
patterns, the hypotheses would have been better supported. 
 Indeed, analysis of the secondary hypotheses supports this idea.  When comparing those 
with a greater tendency to ruminate to those with a lesser tendency to do so, the expected trends 
begin to emerge.  For instance, even though they showed less mood repair in the directed thought 
condition, ruminators showed greater mood repair in the automatic thought condition.  This 
suggests that while an explicit goal is effective for non-ruminators, it may indeed be detrimental 
to ruminators.  Further, when separating the ruminators from the rest of the sample, the predicted 
interaction between instruction and cue type emerged, albeit at the level of a trend.  For instance, 
those in the automatic thought condition reported a greater number of positive thoughts when 
surrounded by positive cues.  Indeed, for this group, the use of an implicit goal seemed to be 
effective.  With this in mind, the idea that the sample was simply “too happy” becomes more 
plausible.  It may be that the hypotheses would have been better supported if those in the sample 
had a greater tendency to ruminate.  While there was not an overwhelming amount of support for 
the moderating effect of rumination, it is certainly worth exploring in future studies. 
 While the primary hypotheses did not find support in this study, the results obtained 
through analysis of the secondary hypotheses warrant further investigation.  The literature clearly 
supports the notion that, for those prone to negative thoughts, actively trying to be positive can 
be detrimental.  For those people, an implicit goal of positivity, such as one induced by one’s 
environment, may be the better option.  Had the sample been limited to those with higher 
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rumination scores and thereby a greater tendency to dwell on negative thoughts, these hypotheses 
may have found better support.  The data regarding the ruminative sample support this notion 
and is worth exploring. 
 Future studies will also benefit from the flaws discovered in this study.  The writing task 
mood induction proved ineffective here, but an improved mood induction could enable a proper 
test of the hypotheses.  Furthermore, the inclusion of more implicit mood measures as dependent 
measures may elucidate effects of explicit versus implicit goals that were obscured in this study 
due to demand characteristics.  All in all, though the results of this particular design did not turn 
out as expected, the study was a useful first step.  There is sufficient evidence here to warrant 
further test of these hypotheses, and hopefully future studies will be able to support the 
effectiveness of implicit goals in improving mood in those for whom explicit goals prove 
detrimental. Research has prompted the search for an emotion regulation system that is not 
subject to the potential problems of explicit goals; this study provides a lead for such a system.  
If positive cues placed in one’s environment can indeed stimulate positive thoughts and thereby 
increase a person’s positivity, as was true for certain individuals in this study, then using such 
cues provides a mechanism of recovery from negative emotions that is less subject to backfire.  
Considering the abundance of models that emphasize actively changing one’s thought patterns, 
evidence supporting a more passive model sheds light on a new approach to recovery from 
negative emotions and/or cognitive patterns.  This mechanism could be instrumental in 
improving outcome for those who are prone to negativity by providing a “first step” to recovery 
from negative emotions.  Implicit goals of positivity could be used to start the generation of more 
positive thoughts.  When enough positive thoughts exist, and negative thoughts are thus reduced, 
then more explicit and active forms of achieving positivity become less “paradoxical” and more 
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likely to succeed.  In this way, the use of an implicit mechanism of mood repair could be used to 
supplement more explicit models for those people who need more of a push toward positivity. 
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Index:  
Table 1: Frequencies of Mood Valence Scores after Mood Induction 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -4 4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
-3 12 7.2 7.3 9.8 
-2 33 19.9 20.1 29.9 
-1 22 13.3 13.4 43.3 
0 14 8.4 8.5 51.8 
1 16 9.6 9.8 61.6 
2 29 17.5 17.7 79.3 
3 27 16.3 16.5 95.7 
4 7 4.2 4.3 100.0 
Total 164 98.8 100.0  
Missing System 2 1.2   
Total 166 100.0   
 
Figure 1: Frequencies of Mood Valence Scores after Mood Induction
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Table 2: R-values for correlations 
 R-value P-value 
Mood repair and thought 
valence 
0.244 0.002 
Mood repair and proportion 
of positive thoughts 
0.254 0.001 
 
Figure 2: Correlation of Mood Repair and Average Thought Valence 
 
Figure 3: Correlation of Mood Repair and Proportion of Positive Thoughts 
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Table 3: Summary of Means for Primary Hypotheses (Full Sample) 
CONDITION Mood Repair Thought 
Valence 
Proportion of 
Positive Thoughts 
Number of Positive 
Thoughts 
Neutral Directed 1.30 3.26 0.43 6.65 
Positive Directed 1.34 3.28 0.45 5.63 
Neutral Automatic 0.29 2.97 0.31 4.00 
Positive Automatic 0.12 3.08 0.36 4.83 
 
Figure 4: Means for Resultant Positivity Across Conditions (Full Sample)  
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Table 4: Resultant Positivity for Secondary Hypotheses 
 Mood Repair Thought 
Valence 
Proportion of Positive 
Thoughts 
Number of Positive 
Thoughts 
High ruminators 0.78 3.31 0.43 5.63 
Low ruminators 0.73 2.98 0.35 4.9 
Optimists 0.94 3.29 0.43 5.81 
Pessimists 0.51 2.95 0.32 4.53 
 
 
Figure 5: Interaction of Level of Rumination and Instruction Type on Mood Repair 
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Table 5: Summary of Means for Primary Hypotheses (Ruminators Only) 
CONDITION Mood Repair Thought 
Valence 
Proportion of 
Positive Thoughts 
Number of Positive 
Thoughts 
Neutral Directed 1.25 2.98 0.34 6.2 
Positive Directed 0.53 2.99 0.380 4.33 
Neutral Automatic 0.70 2.80 0.27 3.43 
Positive Automatic 0.30 3.07 0.37 5.70 
 
 
Figure 6: Interaction of Instruction Type and Cue Type on Number of Positive Thoughts 
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Figure 7: Frequency Distribution of Rumination Scores  
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